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Monetary policy and rejections of the expectations 
hypothesis 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 25/2006 
Federico Ravenna – Juha Seppälä 




We study the rejection of the expectations hypothesis within a New Keynesian 
business cycle model. Earlier research has shown that the Lucas general 
equilibrium asset pricing model can account for neither sign nor magnitude of 
average risk premia in forward prices, and is unable to explain rejection of the 
expectations hypothesis. We show that a New Keynesian model with habit-
formation preferences and a monetary policy feedback rule produces an upward-
sloping average term structure of interest rates, procyclical interest rates, and 
countercyclical term spreads. In the model, as in U.S. data, inverted term structure 
predicts recessions. Most importantly, a New Keynesian model is able to account 
for rejections of the expectations hypothesis. Contrary to earlier work, we identify 
systematic monetary policy as a key factor behind this result. Rejection of the 
expectation hypothesis can be entirely explained by the volatility of just two real 
shocks which affect technology and preferences. 
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Rahapolitiikka, korko-odotukset ja korkojen 
aikarakenne 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 25/2006 
Federico Ravenna – Juha Seppälä 




Tässä työssä tarkastellaan odotushypoteesin – termiinikorot ennakoivat tulevia 
käteismarkkinakorkoja harhattomasti – hylkääntymistä suhdannevaihteluiden 
määräytymistä kuvaavassa dynaamisessa uuskeynesiläisessä makromallissa. 
Aikaisempi tutkimus on osoittanut, että Lucasin kehittämä varallisuuden yleisen 
tasapainon hinnoittelumalli ei kykene selittämään keskimääräisen riskipreemion 
etumerkkiä tai kokoa eikä odotushypoteesin hylkääntymistä. Tässä tutkimuksessa 
sen sijaan osoitetaan, että nouseva tuottokäyrä, suhdanteiden mukaiset korot ja 
suhdanteiden vastaiset pitkien ja lyhyiden termiinikorkojen erot voidaan selittää 
uuskeynesiläisessä makromallissa, jossa keskuspankilla on käytössään korko-
sääntö ja jossa taloudenpitäjien preferenssit riippuvat tavanmuodostuksesta. 
Lisäksi mallissa, kuten myös asianmukaisessa Yhdysvaltain havaintoaineistossa, 
kääntynyt tuottokäyrä ennakoi talouden tulevaa taantumaa. Tämän työn kannalta 
tärkeintä on kuitenkin se, että sen uuskeynesiläinen makromalli kykenee 
selittämään odotushypoteesin hylkääntymisen, joka aiemmasta tutkimuksesta 
poiketen on ennen kaikkea seurausta keskuspankin harjoittamasta systemaattisesta 
rahapolitiikasta. Odotushypoteesin hylkääntyminen voidaan jäännöksettä selittää 
kahden teknologiaan ja preferensseihin vaikuttavan stokastisen häiriön avulla. 
 
Avainsanat: korkojen aikarakenne, rahapolitiikka, jäykät hinnat, tavanmuodostus, 
odotushypoteesi 
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 “ In Blinder (2004, Chapter 3), I suggested (but certainly did not prove)
that the expectations theory fails because long rates are far more sensitive
to short rates than ‘rational’ pricing models predict. This hypothesis may
or may not be correct. My main purpose in calling attention to the term
structure puzzle here is not to resolve it, but rather to urge central bank
research departments to give it high priority. It may be the piece of the
monetary transmission mechanism about which we are most in the dark.”
Alan S. Blinder, “Monetary Policy Today,” 2006.
1 Introduction
The term structure of interest rates contains information about agents’ expectations
of future interest rates, inﬂation rates, and exchange rates.1 Along with the high
yield and commercial paper spread, the interest rate term spread between long and
short maturity Treasury Bills has been repeatedly shown to have predictive power for
various indicators of the U.S. business cycle in the postwar period.2
Because prices of securities at diﬀerent maturities embody ﬁnancial market par-
ticipants’ expectations of future economic activity, the term structure of interest rates
is an invaluable source of information for monetary authorities.3 But the vast litera-
ture on dynamic models of the term structure relies on latent factor models, and as
such does not oﬀer insight into the relationships between term structure movements
and business cycle indicators. More recently, researchers have begun to investigate
the relationship between term structure and macro variables in reduced-form VAR
or semi-structural models that impose the absence of arbitrage restrictions.4 Struc-
tural general equilibrium models derive the term structure from agents’ optimizing
behavior and explain all of the interest rate dynamics by the volatility of macroeco-
nomic variables. Unfortunately, standard models that have become the workhorses
of modern macroeconomics have counterfactual implications for the term structure.
First, Donaldson, Johnsen, and Mehra (1990) show that whereas in the U.S. nom-
inal term structure interest rates are procyclical and term spreads countercyclical, the
Neoclassical stochastic growth model predicts interest rates to be countercyclical and
term spreads procyclical. Variations on the Real Business Cycle model and models
containing nominal frictions have all been shown to be lacking in some dimension
when used to model the term structure.5
Second, Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) show that the Lucas (1978) general
equilibrium asset pricing model can account for neither sign nor magnitude of average
risk premia in forward prices and holding-period returns. Thus the model is unable
to explain rejection of the expectations hypothesis, that forward rates are unbiased
predictors of future spot rates, which has been extensively documented by empirical
studies. The most common interpretation of this result is that it is evidence of the
existence of a time-varying risk premium.6
1See Fama (1975, 1990) and Mishkin (1981, 1990a, 1992) for studies on inﬂation expectations and
the term structure of interest rates using U.S. data. Mishkin (1991) and Jorion and Mishkin (1991)
use international data. Abken (1993) and Blough (1994) provide surveys of the literature.
2See Harvey (1988), Chen (1991), and Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991).
3Svensson (1994a,b) and S¨ oderlind and Svensson (1997) discuss monetary policy and the term
structure of interest rates as a source of information. Evans and Marshall (1998), Piazzesi (2005),
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002, 2005), and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) are recent contributions to this
literature.
4Piazzesi (2005), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002, 2005), Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Rudebusch and
Wu (2004), H¨ ordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2003).
5See King and Watson (1996), Den Haan (1995), Evans and Marshall (1998).
6This literature is extensive. Useful surveys are provided by Melino (1988), Shiller (1990),
7In order for policy-makers to extract information about market expectations from
the term structure they need to know the sign and magnitude of risk premia embedded
in interest rates. Referring to research by Backus, Gregory, and Zin and other authors,
S¨ oderlind and Svensson (1997) note in their review:
“We have no direct measurement of this (potentially) time-varying co-
variance [risk premium], and even ex post data is of limited use since the
stochastic discount factor is not observable. It has unfortunately proved to
be very hard to explain (U.S. ex post) term premia by either utility based
asset pricing models or various proxies for risk.”
In this paper, we build a New Keynesian general equilibrium model to explain
the term structure of interest rates. The model displays short-run monetary non-
neutrality, so that the behavior of the monetary authority aﬀects the business cycle
dynamics. Because monetary policy responds systematically to movements in en-
dogenous variables, changes in the way policy is conducted aﬀect the co-variation of
real and nominal variables, and play an important role in the dynamics of the term
structure. We show that the model can match the average nominal term structure in
post-war U.S. data and produces procyclical interest rates and countercyclical term
spreads. The term spread has predictive power for future economic activity. Most
importantly, the model is able to account for rejections of the expectations hypothesis.
Our results show that rejection of the expectation hypothesis hinges on habit-
formation preferences and on modeling of the systematic portion of monetary policy.
Without habit formation, average term spreads are very close to zero and yield volatil-
ities at all maturities are reduced. As the policy rule changes, average term structure,
risk premia volatility and correlations with macro variables will change. This is also
true in the absence of policy shocks. In fact, we show that rejection of the expec-
tation hypothesis can be entirely explained by the volatility of just two real shocks
which aﬀect technology and preferences. Finally, a large or very volatile inﬂation risk
premium cannot explain rejection of the expectations hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The rest of this Section runs through
the related literature in more detail. Section 2 explains the New Keynesian model
that we use, Section 3 discusses our techiniques for solving the model numerically, and
Section 4 explains the parameterization of the model. Section 5 reports the results
related to the term structure. Section 6 discusses the relationship between monetary
policy and term structure, and Section 7 concludes. Appendix A derives the inﬂation
rate dynamics in our model.
1.1 Related literature
A growing literature investigates the relationship between macroeconomic variables
and term structure within reduced-form or semi-structural models imposing no-arbitrage
restrictions, and ﬁnd that macro-variables can improve the predictive power of latent
factor models. Piazzesi (2005) shows that Federal Reserve policy can be better ap-
proximated by assuming that it responds only to information contained in the term
structure and not to other macroeconomic variables. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)
show that the monetary policy shocks can explain 45% of excess nominal bond re-
turns, and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) show that the term structure explains 64%
of changes in the federal funds target rate. Ang and Piazzesi (2003) introduce no-
arbitrage restrictions in a VAR model of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables.
Mishkin (1990b), and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). Often cited individual studies are
Shiller (1979), Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983), Fama (1984, 1990), Fama and Bliss (1987),
Froot (1989), Campbell and Shiller (1991), and Campbell (1995).
8Research on joint macro-ﬁnance model (H¨ ordahl, Tristani, and Vestin, 2003,
Rudebusch and Wu, 2004) aims at integrating small scale optimizing models of out-
put, inﬂation and interest rates with aﬃne no-arbitrage speciﬁcations for bond prices.
In this way, it is possible to identify the aﬃne model latent factors with the macroe-
conomic aggregates.
An important goal of this recent literature is to relate yield dynamics to macro-
factors in order to be able to analyze what portion of yield volatility can be explained
by observable factors. In both VAR and joint macro-ﬁnance models the market
price of risk is modeled only in reduced-form fashion, rather than being derived from
optimizing behavior.
Among general equilibrium models of the term structure, Evans and Marshall
(1998) show that a limited participation model is broadly consistent with the impulse
response functions of real and nominal yields to a monetary policy shock. How-
ever, Piazzesi (2005) criticizes their methodology on the grounds that it does not
impose the no-arbitrage condition on yield movements. Dai (2002) shows that a
model with limited participation can explain the term premium puzzle—it can gener-
ate countercyclical term spreads. Sepp¨ al¨ a (2004) studies asset pricing implications of
an endowment economy when agents can default on contracts. The results show that
this limited commitment model aﬀords a potential solution to the term premium
puzzle. Both Dai and Sepp¨ al¨ a study only the real term structure. Buraschi and
Jiltsov (2003) and Wachter (2004) show that an external habit model ` a la Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) is capable of explaining the term premium puzzle. Duﬀee (2002)
and Dai and Singleton (2002) study the term premium puzzle for nominal yields using
reduced form no-arbitrage models. None of these models rely on nominal rigidities
business cycle models. Sepp¨ al¨ a and Xie (2004) are closer in spirit to our approach.
The authors study the cyclical behavior of nominal and (ex-ante) real term struc-
tures of interest rates in UK data, in real business cycle, limited participation, and
New Keynesian models. Their result is that the New Keynesian model gets closest
to matching cyclical behavior for both nominal and real term structures.
Two recent papers by Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2005) and H¨ ordahl, Tristani and
Vestin (2005) examine the term structure implications of a business cycle model with
nominal price staggering and endogenous monetary policy. Both papers use the New
Keynesian framework. Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2005) estimate a log-linear three
equation New Keynesian model using a Maximum Likelihood estimator, and derive an
endogenous log-normal term structure consistent with household preferences. While
the model ensures that the observable macro-variables are consistent with ﬁrms’ and
households’ optimizing behavior, it also introduces two unobservable state variables,
so that the dynamics are driven by a total of ﬁve exogenous shocks.
H¨ ordahl, Tristani and Vestin (2005) use a second-order approximation to derive
the law of motion for both macro variables and bond prices, and show that a New
Keynesian model can account for both the positive slope of the yield curve and the
constant volatility of yields across maturities. The paper shows that to achieve these
results the model must allow for a very high level of persistence in exogenous shocks
(the authors report parameterizations of AR(1) coeﬃcients on the order of 0.99).
Our model is closely related to H¨ ordahl, Tristani and Vestin (2005), but our solution
method relies on a third-order approximation. In fact, none of the papers cited derive
time-varying risk premia, and therefore cannot address the expectations hypothesis
puzzle in a fully optimizing context.
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) study the inﬂation risk premium in a continuous-time
general equilibrium model in which the monetary authority sets the money supply
based on targets for long-term growth of the nominal money supply, inﬂation, and
economic growth. They identify the time-variation of the inﬂation risk premium as an
important explanatory variable for deviations from the expectations hypothesis. In
9contrast, in our model the monetary policy authority follows an interest rate rule—a
more accurate description of the actual conduct of monetary policy in most countries.
Since the source of monetary non-neutrality diﬀers, it is not surprising that our
conclusions diﬀer. Contrary to their results, we ﬁnd that in our model monetary
policy shocks and inﬂation risk premium do not explain rejections of the expectations
hypothesis.
Our results are related to earlier contributions by Mankiw and Miron (1986)
and McCallum (1996). Like us, these authors emphasize the role of central bank
smoothing of interest rates in rejection of the expectations hypothesis. Unlike us,
they employ exogenously determined risk premia. Gallmeyer, Holliﬁeld, and Zin
(2005) revisit McCallum’s explanation in a context similar to that of Bekaert, Cho,
and Moreno (2005). While Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno assume that the expectations
hypothesis holds, Gallmeyer, Holliﬁeld, and Zin are able to reject the hypothesis by
assuming either (i) stochastic volatility of state variables or (ii) state-dependent “price
of risk” in the pricing-kernel speciﬁcation. Our approach is similar to (ii). Consumers
in our model face stochastic preference shocks, which leads to a state-dependent price
of risk. However, we do not restrict ourselves to aﬃne term structure models.
2 The model
The theoretical interest rate term structure is derived from a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model of the business cycle. We adopt a money-in-utility-function
model where nominal rigidities allow monetary policy to aﬀect the dynamics of real
variables. The modeling framework follows Calvo (1983) and the New Keynesian
literature on the business cycle by assuming that prices cannot be updated to the
proﬁt-maximizing level in each period. Firms face an exogenous, constant probability
of being able to reset the price in any period t. This setup can also be derived from a
menu cost model, where ﬁrms face a randomly distributed ﬁxed cost kt of updating
the price charged, and the support of kt is [0;k], k → ∞ (see Klenow and Kryvtsov,
2004).
While a more sophisticated pricing mechanism could be introduced—such as state-
dependent pricing (Dotsey, King and Wolman, 1999), partial indexation to past prices
(Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005), a mix of rule-of-thumb and forward-
looking pricing (Gali and Gertler, 1999)—we limit the model to the more essential
ingredients of the New Keynesian framework. This allows us to investigate the impact
on term structure of four key features: (i) systematic monetary policy modeled as an
interest rate rule; (ii) nominal price rigidity; (iii) habit-formation preferences; (iv)
positive steady state money growth rate. Woodford (2003) oﬀers a comprehensive
treatment of the New Keynesian framework, and describes in detail the microfoun-
dations of the model.
Each consumer owns shares in all ﬁrms, and households are rebated for any proﬁt
from the monopolistically competitive output sector. Savings can be accumulated in
money balances or in a range of riskless nominal and real bonds of several maturities.
The government runs a balanced budget in every period, and rebates to consumers
any seigniorage revenue from issuing the monetary asset. Output is produced with
undiﬀerentiated labor, supplied by household-consumers, via a linear production func-
tion.
102.1 Households
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households, indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Consumers
demand diﬀerentiated consumption goods, choosing from a continuum of goods, in-
dexed by z ∈ [0,1]. In the notation used throughout the paper, C
j
t(z) indicates
consumption by household j at time t of the good produced by ﬁrm z.














, θ > 1. (2.1)




















Nt denotes labor supply, Mt nominal money balances, Pt the aggregate price level,























































and (2.1). When b > 0 preferences are characterized by habit formation (Boldrin,
Christiano, and Fisher, 2001 and Jermann, 1998). Dt is an aggregate stochastic
preference shock. Each element of the row vector − → p t represents the price of an asset
with maturity k that will pay one unit of currency in period t+k. The corresponding
element of
− →
B t represents the quantity of such claims purchased by the household.
B
j
t−1 indicates the value of the household portfolio of claims maturing at time t. Wt
is the nominal wage rate, and τ is the lump-sum tax imposed by the government.
Finally, the households own the ﬁrms and Πt is the proﬁt from the ﬁrms.
The solution to the intratemporal expenditure allocation problem between the











Equation (2.4) is the demand for good z from household j, where θ is the price elas-
ticity of demand. The associated price index Pt measures the minimum expenditure








Since all households solve an identical optimization problem and face the same
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where MUC is the marginal utility of consumption.
2.2 Firms and price setting
The ﬁrm producing good z employs a linear technology:
Yt(z) = AtNt(z), (2.8)
where At is an aggregate productivity shock. Minimizing the nominal cost WtNt(z)
of producing a given amount of output Y yields the labor demand schedule:
MCN
t (z)MPLt(z) = Wt, (2.9)
where MCN is the nominal marginal cost, MPL is the marginal product of labor
(Yt(z)/Nt(z)). Equation (2.9) implies that the real marginal cost MCt of producing
one unit of output is
MCt(z)MPLt(z) = Wt/Pt.
Firms adjust their prices infrequently. In each period there is a constant proba-
bility (1 − θp) that the ﬁrm will be able to adjust its price regardless of past history.
This implies that the fraction of ﬁrms setting prices at t is (1−θp) and the expected
waiting time for the next price adjustment is 1
1−θp. The problem of the ﬁrm setting
























In (2.11), Yt,t+i(z) is the ﬁrm’s demand function for its output at time t+i, conditional
on the price set at time t, Pt(z). Market clearing insures that Yt,t+i(z) = Ct,t+i(z) and














































is the ﬂexible-price level of the markup, which is also the markup that would be
observed in a zero-inﬂation (zero money growth rate) steady state. To use rational
expectations solution algorithms when the steady state money growth rate is non-
zero, we must express the ﬁrst order condition as a diﬀerence equation (see Ascari,
2004, and King and Wolman, 1996). This can be accomplished expressing Pt(z) as















ˆ Gt = µMUCtMCtPθ−1
t Yt + θpβ ˆ Gt+1 (2.16)
ˆ Ht = MUCtPθ−1
t Yt + θpβ ˆ Ht+1. (2.17)
2.3 Market clearing
Since the measure of the economy is unitary, in the symmetric equilibrium it holds
that M
j
t = Mt, C
j
t = Ct, and the consumption shadow price is symmetric across
households: MUC
j
t = MUCt. Given that all ﬁrms are able to purchase the same
labor service bundle, and so are charged the same aggregate wage, they all face the
same marginal cost. The linear production technology ensures that MC is equal
across ﬁrms—whether or not they are updating their price—regardless of the level of
production, which will indeed be diﬀerent. Firms are heterogeneous in that a fraction
(1 − θp) of ﬁrms in the interval [0,1] can optimally choose the price charged at time
t. In equilibrium each producer that chooses a new price Pt(z) in period t will choose
the same new price Pt(z) and the same level of output. Thus the dynamics of the




t−1 + (1 − θp)Pt(z)1−θ
i 1
1−θ . (2.18)
Because ﬁrms charge diﬀerent prices, aggregation implies Yt 6= AtNt.7 To see this,




































dz. Up to a ﬁrst order approximation, st = 1. But since
we use higher order approximations, price dispersion results in the introduction of an
additional state variable st. Its law of motion can be expressed recursively as





+ θp(1 + πt)θst−1.
Appendix A shows that the inﬂation rate dynamics is given by
[(1 + πt)]
















In a steady state with gross money growth rate equal to Υ and gross inﬂation















Since Pt(z) is the optimal price chosen by the fraction of ﬁrms that can re-optimize
at time t, Pt(z)/Pt is the inverse of what King and Wolman (1996) deﬁne as the price
wedge. With zero steady state inﬂation, the steady state average markup is equal
to 1/MC, so there is no price wedge. But when steady state inﬂation is positive,
the price wedge is less than one: the average price is always smaller than the optimal
price, since some ﬁrms would like to increase the price but are constrained from doing
so. Combining equation (2.20) with equation (2.19) yields the steady state marginal





















The government rebates seigniorage revenues to the household in the form of lump-
sum transfers, so that in any time t the government budget is balanced. Since we
deﬁned in equation (2.3) τj as the amount of tax levied by the government on house-
hold j, assuming τ
j
t = τi











= −τt = Ms
t − Ms
t−1.





14We assume the monetary policy instrument is the short term nominal interest rate
(1 + R1,t). The money supply is set by the monetary authority to satisfy whatever
money demand is consistent with the target rate.
Bonds are in zero-net supply, since the government does not issue bonds. There-
fore in equilibrium it must hold that
Bt,i = 0




The economy’s dynamics are driven by business cycle shocks temporarily away from
the non-stochastic steady state. In such instances, the domestic monetary authority














where ωπ, ωy ≥ 0 are the feedback coeﬃcients for CPI inﬂation and output. The
monetary authority adjusts the interest rate in response to deviations of target vari-
ables from the steady state. In the steady state, a constant money growth rate rule
is followed. Choosing parameters ωπ, ωy allows us to specify alternative monetary
policies. When the central bank responds to current rather than expected inﬂation
equation (2.21) yields the rule suggested by Taylor (1993) as a description of U.S.
monetary policy.
We assume the central bank assigns positive weight to an interest rate smoothing
objective, so that the domestic short-term interest rate at time t is set according to
(1 + R1,t) =
￿￿
1 + Rt,t+1




where χ ∈ [0,1) is the degree of smoothing and ε
mp
t is an unanticipated exogenous
shock to monetary policy.
3 Algorithm
We solve the model using a third-order approximation around the non-stochastic
steady state. The numerical solution is obtained using Dynare++.8 It is well known
that taking a ﬁrst-order approximation of bond prices will yield no risk premia and
that a second-order approximation will yield only constant premia. The reason is
simple: second-order approximation involves only squared prediction error terms with
constant expectations.
In the ﬁrst step, we solve our model for six state variables and seven control vari-
ables in 13 equations using Dynare++ version 1.3.1. In the second step, we generate
200,000 observations of state and control variables. In the ﬁnal step, we regress the
future marginal rates of substitution—see equations (5.3) and (5.4) below—on third-
order complete polynomials of state variables using ﬁtted regression to approximate
conditional expectations. Our approach is very similar to the Monte Carlo approach
employed by Evans and Marshall (1998). The algorithm amounts to taking a third-
order approximation of bond prices. With third-order approximation, the current
state variables multiply squared prediction error terms, and hence risk premia are
time-varying.
8Dynare++ is available for free at http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare.
154 Model parameterization
Our speciﬁcation of preference, technology and policy parameters follows the New
Keynesian monetary business cycle literature.9 Household preferences are modeled
within the internal habit-formation framework of Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher
(2001). The habit formation coeﬃcient is parameterized to b = 0.8, a value that
Constantinides (1990) ﬁnds can explain the equity premium puzzle. The value of γ
is set at 2.5, to provide adequate curvature in the utility function so as to facilitate
model generation of risk-premia volatility. The preference parameterization plays a
key role in the model’s term-structure properties. Its impact on the results is discussed
in detail in the next section. The labor supply elasticity (1/η) is set equal to 2. The
parameter ` is chosen to set steady state labor hours at about 30% of available time,
a value consistent with postwar data in the U.S. and in many OECD countries. The
quarterly discount factor β is parameterized so that the steady state real interest rate
is equal to 1%.
The parameterization of demand elasticity θ implies a ﬂexible-price equilibrium
producers’ markup of µ = θ/(θ − 1) = 1.1. While Bernanke and Gertler (2000)
use a higher value (1.2), our assumption of positive steady state inﬂation implies
that the steady state markup is larger than in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. The
parameterization chosen for the Calvo (1983) pricing adjustment mechanism implies
an average price duration of one year. This value is in line with estimates for the
U.S. over the last forty years obtained from aggregate data (Gali and Gertler, 1999,
Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez, 2005).
A large number of variants of the monetary policy instrument rule (2.22) have
been estimated with U.S. data, in both single-equation and simultaneous-equation
contexts. The inﬂation feedback coeﬃcient ωπ is set at 1.5. This value is substantially
lower than the one estimated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) for the Volker-
Greenspan tenure, but close to the estimate in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005)
for the longer 1960–2001 period and averages across diﬀerent monetary regimes in
post-war U.S. data. The choice of a value for ωy is more controversial; it depends on
the operational deﬁnition of output gap used by the central bank at any given point
in time. In our benchmark parameterization we choose a value of ωy = 0. Estimates
of instrument rules across a large number of OECD countries consistently ﬁnd very
inertial behavior for the policy interest rate. In our model the smoothing parameter
χ is assumed equal to 0.9, a value consistent with available estimates. In the following
sections we discuss the impact of alternative assumptions for behavior of the monetary
authority on the term structure results. Quarterly steady state inﬂation is set equal
to the average U.S. value over the period 1994 − 2004, about 0.75%. This implies an
annualized steady state nominal interest rate of 7%.
The preference and technology exogenous shocks follow an AR(1) process:
logZt = (1 − ρZ)logZ + ρZ logZt−1 + εZ
t , εZ
t ∼ iid N(0,σ2
Z);
where Z is the steady state value of the variable. The policy shock ε
mp
t is a Gaus-
sian i.i.d. stochastic process. The autocorrelation parameters for technology and
preference shocks are equal to ρa = 0.9 and ρd = 0.95. The standard deviation of
innovations εZ
t for technology, preference and policy shock is set at σa = 0.0035,
σd = 0.08, σmp = 0.003. The low value for policy shock volatility implies that the ma-
jor part of the short term nominal interest rate dynamics is driven by the systematic
monetary policy reaction to the state of the economy. The preference shock volatility
9Numerous authors discuss the empirical performance of the New Kynesian framework. For ref-
erences to estimated and calibrated staggered price-adjustment models, see Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005), Ireland (2001), Ravenna (2006), Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005), Woodford
(2003).
16Table 1. Selected variable volatilities and correlations. Sample:
1952–2006.
Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
Variable Model U.S. Data Model U.S. Data
Yt 2.01 1.59 1 1
πt 3.49 3.00 0.20 0.19
Rt 1.84 2.82 0.17 0.17
rt 3.84 2.32 −0.08 −0.13
is large but very close to that estimated by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005) with
U.S. data. Compared to the business cycle literature, the technology shock volatility
is low. The chosen parameterization is necessary to allow the model to generate a
positive correlation between nominal interest rate and GDP, since technology shocks
produce negative comovements between these variables.
An important concern in the parameterization of shocks has been to match the
correlations between output and nominal and real rates with U.S. data, to be able
to evaluate whether the term structure generated by the model can predict output
variation, as in many empirical studies of the U.S. Table 1 compares the model’s
second moments and correlations with output to the U.S. post-war data sample.10
This sample is heterogeneous with respect to U.S. monetary policy goals and U.S.
Federal Reserve operating procedures, and includes the 1970s inﬂationary episode.
On the other hand, the sample can be considered representative of the variety of
shocks that drove the U.S. business cycle.
The match with empirical correlations is quite good. To obtain this result the
model volatilities for output, real interest rate and inﬂation turn out to be larger
than in the data. The empirical ﬁt of the model can be improved with a number
of modiﬁcations, including sticky wages, hybrid backward and forward-looking price
setting speciﬁcations, an autocorrelated exogenous process driving the dynamics of
the inﬂation target, and cost-push shocks. Our eﬀort focused on investigating whether
a minimal set of modiﬁcations to the Neoclassical growth model can explain the
behavior of risk premia over the business cycle. In the follwing sections we compare
the parameterized model predictions to the U.S. post-war nominal term structure.
Most of the stylized facts we investigate are consistent across monetary policy regime
changes during this period, and so we rely on a single parameterization for the policy
rule. The sensitivity analysis shows that most results are surprisingly robust to
alternative parameterization assumptions.
10Standard deviation measured in per cent. The output series is logged and Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁltered. U.S. data: Yt is real GDP, πt is CPI inﬂation, Rt is 3-month T-bill rate, rt is ex-post short
term real interest rate. All rates are on annual basis. Quarterly data sample is 1952:1–2006:1. We
chose to use the period following the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951 in order to avoid
having to contend with the constraint on interest rate movements imposed by the Federal Reserve’s
“par pegging” of Government securities prices. Real GDP is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and the rest of the data are from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank FRED II database.
175 Term structure of interest rates
5.1 Real and nominal term structures
































The bond prices are invariant with respect to time; hence equations (5.3) and (5.4)
give a recursive formula for pricing zero-coupon real and nominal bonds of any ma-
turity.









Prices are related to rates (or yields) by11
fn,t = −log(p
f
n,t) and rn,t = −(1/n)log(pb
n,t). (5.5)
Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations with output for
selected maturities in the term structure in the model, and for U.S. nominal data as
estimated by Global Financial Data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1952 to the ﬁrst quarter
of 2006. Output is ﬁltered using the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) ﬁlter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600 in both the model and the data.
The average term structure is upward-sloping in both the model and the data.
Means match quite well: the model produces nominal yields varying from 5.01% to
6.60% for three months to 20 years maturity, while the corresponding U.S. yields
varied from 5.03% to 6.60%.
Table 2 shows that the model generates procyclical nominal interest rates and
countercyclical term spreads. This matches the positive correlation between yields
and the cyclical component of output observed in U.S. data at maturities up to one
year. The nominal term spreads are countercyclical in both U.S. data and the model
at all maturities.
11Nominal prices and rates are obtained in a similar manner.
18Table 2. Main term structure statistics. Data: 1952–2006. (N/A
missing due to shortage of data.)
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
R1,t (model) 5.01198 1.84042 0.16560
R4,t (model) 6.22698 1.40906 0.25269
R40,t (model) 6.59399 0.56985 0.40510
R80,t (model) 6.59911 0.33910 0.40896
R120,t (model) 6.59905 0.22477 0.40717
R1,t (data) 5.03359 2.81717 0.17491
R4,t (data) 5.60977 3.05969 0.14690
R40,t (data) 6.42456 2.76373 −0.01473
R80,t (data) 6.60014 2.71775 −0.04062
R120,t (data) N/A N/A N/A
R40,t − R1,t (model) 1.58202 1.50547 −0.04911
R80,t − R1,t (model) 1.58713 1.63395 −0.10166
R120,t − R1,t (model) 1.58707 1.70057 −0.12540
R40,t − R4,t (model) 0.36702 0.98454 −0.12717
R80,t − R4,t (model) 0.37213 1.14983 −0.18905
R120,t − R4,t (model) 0.37207 1.23425 −0.21433
R40,t − R1,t (data) 1.39097 1.13509 −0.46998
R80,t − R1,t (data) 1.56654 1.32127 −0.45650
R120,t − R1,t (data) N/A N/A N/A
R40,t − R4,t (data) 0.81479 1.01890 −0.48109
R80,t − R4,t (data) 0.99037 1.24971 −0.44800
R120,t − R1,t (data) N/A N/A N/A
19Table 3. Selected term structure statistics in selected time peri-
ods.
1952–2006 1960–2006 1980–2006 1988–2006
E[R4,t] 5.60977 6.15297 6.47552 4.87137
E[R40,t] 6.42456 6.99016 7.65848 6.15603
E[R40,t − R4,t] 0.81479 0.83719 1.18295 1.28466
std(R4,t) 3.05969 2.96079 3.44313 2.08718
std(R40,t) 2.76373 2.59025 2.92400 1.56503
std(R40,t − R4,t) 1.01890 1.07935 1.12390 1.06067
corr(R4,t,Yt) 0.14690 0.18143 0.07312 0.57920
corr(R40,t,Yt) −0.01473 0.00426 −0.06326 0.29255
corr(R40,t − R4,t,Yt) −0.48109 −0.48747 −0.38859 −0.70809
These results show that the New Keynesian model can explain the term spread
puzzle that emerges in the Neoclassical stochastic growth model. Donaldson, Johnsen,
and Mehra (1990) show that in a stochastic growth model with full depreciation the
term structure of (ex-ante) real interest rates is at odds with empirical evidence: it
rises at the peak of the business cycle and falls at the trough. In addition, at the peak
of the cycle the term structure lies uniformly below the term structure at the trough.
The economic intuition for the behavior of interest rates is straightforward, working
through the link between marginal utility of consumption, expected consumption
growth and interest rates. At the cycle peak aggregate and individual consumption
are expected to be, on average, lower in the future, and so the agents will want to
save more. In equilibrium interest rates will therefore be lower. At the cycle trough
aggregate and individual consumption are expected to be higher in the future, and
so agents’ incentive to save is reduced, which raises interest rates. Similar intuition
explains the model’s procyclical term spread.
Donaldson, Johnsen, and Mehra (1990) results are not general (Labadie, 1994).
Introducing exogenous shocks, in addition to the stochastic process for total factor
productivity, can generate procyclical interest rates (Walsh, 2003 gives an example in
a money-in-utility framework). Yet even the models examined by King and Watson
(1996), despite generating procyclical interest rates, cannot account for the empirical
fact that high real or nominal interest rates predict a low level of economic activity
two to four quarters in the future.
The New Keynesian model is not able to reproduce two important features of
post-war U.S. data: constant volatility and decreasing correlation with output of
nominal yields as the maturity increases. The model produces a downward-sloping
term structure of volatilities and strong positive correlation between yields and (the
cyclical component of) output at all maturities. The decreasing volatility of nominal
rates is a counterfactual implication already identiﬁed by Den Haan (1995) for ﬂexible-
price models of the business cycle.
Interestingly, the model predictions of term structure of volatilities and correlation
between yields and output get closer to the data as the sample is restricted to the
more recent period. Table 3 presents selected term structure statistics for the samples
1952:1–2006:1, 1960:1–2006:1, 1980:1–2006:1, and 1988:1–2006:1.
In both the 1980–2006 and 1988–2006 samples, the term structure of volatilities
is clearly downward-sloping. 12 In the 1988–2006 sample, the correlation between
yield and output is strongly positive. The upward-sloping mean term structure and
12Sepp¨ al¨ a (2000) documents that UK nominal and real term structure of volatilities is downward-
sloping.
20countercyclical term spreads are robust features across subsamples. On the other
hand, the level of interest rates depends on how much relatively high interest rates in
the early 1980’s weigh on the data. The average one-year rate was 160 basis points
higher in 1980–2006 compared to 1988–2006.
The high volatility of long rates observed in the full sample is associated in the
data with periods of volatile inﬂation. What the New Keynesian model is missing
is a mechanism to generate persistent changes in the inﬂation rate target, implying
persistent changes in the expected future policy rate. As it is, the model necessarily
generates strongly mean-reverting interest rates. This also means that the impact
of policy shocks on long rates is much smaller than on short rates, and that the
correlation between policy rate and long yields decreases with time. Adding to the
model a very persistent shock to the policy inﬂation target, as in Rudebusch and Wu
(2004) or H¨ ordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2005), would contribute to an increase in the
volatility of long rates. Similarly, a varying long-term inﬂation target would lower
the correlation between long maturity yields and output. Additionally, the output-
nominal yields correlation would be lowered in a more realistic model including time-
to-build constraints, convex costs of capital adjustment, and lags in the impact of
monetary policy on real variables.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
Table 4 reports on how New Keynesian model term structure statistics vary depending
on the parameterization. The most striking feature of Table 4 is that the upward-
sloping average term structure is a very robust feature in a New Keynesian model. All
parameterizations in the table share this feature. In contrast, the ﬂexible price models
studied by Den Haan (1995) generate downward-sloping average term structure in a
real production economy and a ﬂat average term structure in a monetary production
economy.
Table 4. Sensitivity of term structure statistics to diﬀerent pa-
rameter values. BM = benchmark. ρ(404,Y ) ≡ ρ(R40,t −
R4,t,Yt).
E[R4,t] E[R40,t] σ(R4,t) σ(R40,t) ρ(R4,t,Yt) ρ(R40,t,Yt) ρ(404,Y )
BM 6.22698 6.59399 1.40906 0.56985 0.25269 0.40510 −0.12717
b = 0 6.56884 6.59656 1.33915 0.49197 0.12565 0.40615 0.03317
γ = 1.5 6.20214 6.55681 1.72850 0.62184 0.09803 0.38814 0.05169
χ = 0.7 6.71426 6.90667 1.86154 0.93034 0.30888 0.41399 −0.17036
πss = 1.0 3.22414 3.56710 1.30479 0.54342 0.25729 0.40539 −0.12830
πss = 1.01 7.22419 7.59962 1.46793 0.59306 0.25338 0.40638 −0.12748
ωy = 0.1 5.08460 5.28123 3.16343 1.32989 −0.43732 −0.43132 0.42163
ωπ = 3.0 6.67072 6.91731 1.12834 0.41932 0.16844 0.38960 −0.03112
ωπ = 1.2 5.52783 5.94096 1.59132 0.68219 0.30698 0.41359 −0.19912
θp = 0.5 6.12833 6.38865 1.17923 0.55357 0.36111 0.41951 −0.27247
σd=0,
σa=0.01 6.28834 6.59019 1.13221 0.23745 −0.57675 −0.44570 0.58735
σa = 0 6.22289 6.59189 1.38130 0.59251 0.25908 0.41618 −0.11824
σmp = 0 6.89120 6.97486 1.05324 0.56802 0.37047 0.42395 −0.28082
σmp = 0.006 4.32110 5.57434 2.03739 0.60145 0.12236 0.34697 −0.02520
ρd=ρa=0.99,
σmp=0,χ=0.95 6.76933 6.94859 0.78090 0.67981 0.11718 0.17388 0.13693
Procyclical interest rates and countercyclical term spreads obtain under many,
though not all, parameterizations of the New Keynesian model. The preferences
speciﬁcation plays a key role. In a model without habit formation, the term structure
is only mildly upward-sloping. It is not surprising that—as we show below—habit-
21formation preferences are a necessary condition for the model to reject the expecta-
tions hypothesis. A smaller value of γ reduces the curvature of the utility function and
will also aﬀect the market price of risk. Both these deviations from baseline preference
parameterization imply that the model loses the ability to generate countercyclical
term spreads.
Without stochastic shocks to marginal utility of consumption the model coun-
terfactually predicts countercyclical interest rates and procyclical term spreads. A
similar implication is obtained in a model where the monetary authority reacts to de-
viations of output from steady state, even if with a low feedback coeﬃcient ωy = 0.1.
Diﬀerent values of steady state inﬂation have instead very little impact on the results,
except for shifting the whole nominal term structure.
The term structure of volatility is highly sensitive to the stochastic process for
monetary policy innovation. Table 4 shows that as the volatility of this shock is
decreased, the term structure of volatility becomes ﬂatter. In fact the last row in
the table shows that one shortcoming of the New Keynesian model—the downward-
sloping term structure of volatilities—can be overcome by a combination of highly
persistent shocks and a high degree of interest rate smoothing (increasing the volatility
of long rates), and low volatility of monetary policy shocks (lowering the volatility of
short rates).
5.3 Term structure predictions of future economic activity
Every major recession in the U.S. since the early 1950s has been predicted by an
inverted (downward-sloping) term structure of interest rates.13 As discussed above,
the stochastic growth model with ﬂexible prices produces the opposite prediction.
The New Keynesian model can explain the term spread forecasting power found in
empirical studies.
We compare the New Keynesian model’s predictions with one well-known paper
on the relationship between term spread and future consumption growth. Estrella and
Hardouvelis (1991) use the term spread to predict future changes in log consumption
growth one to four years ahead. The estimation equation uses quarterly observations
of U.S. real consumption of non-durables and services over the 1960:1-2006:1 sample
regressed on the yield spread between 10-year government bond and 3-month Treasury
bill.14 Table 5 presents the regression results of equation
(100/n) ∗ (log(ct+n) − log(ct)) = β0 + β1(r10,t − r1,t) for n = 1,2,3,4 years
for the data and the benchmark model with 200,000 observations. The standard
errors are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. An upward-
sloping term structure clearly predicts expansions in both our model and the data,
and a downward-sloping term structure clearly predicts recessions, in both the model
and the data. Moreover, β1 decreases with the forecast horizon in both the model
and the data.
13A large literature has examined the predictive power of the term structure of interest rates for
future interest rates, consumption growth, and other measures of future economic activity. Fama and
Bliss (1987) use forward spread to predict future changes in one-year interest rates one to four years
ahead. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) show that the term spread has predictive power for future
changes in log-consumption growth up to four years ahead in US data from 1955 to 1988. Dotsey
(1998) points out that many studies have found the term spread to contain signiﬁcant information for
predicting economic activity also in the most recent U.S. data. Estrella (2005) provides an exhaustive
list of references.
14Consumption data are from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank FRED II database. Yield data
are from Global Financial Data.
22Table 5. Term spread forecasts of future consumption growth n
years ahead.
Regression β0 se(β0) β1 se(β1) R2
Benchmark (n = 1) −0.1997 0.0070 0.5468 0.0070 0.0307
Benchmark (n = 2) −0.1866 0.0059 0.5112 0.0059 0.0379
Benchmark (n = 3) −0.1827 0.0050 0.5007 0.0050 0.0493
Benchmark (n = 4) −0.1766 0.0043 0.4841 0.0044 0.0605
Data (n = 1) 2.6826 0.1694 0.5063 0.1131 0.1193
Data (n = 2) 2.8213 0.1471 0.3499 0.0974 0.0824
Data (n = 3) 2.9405 0.1248 0.1622 0.0852 0.0233
Data (n = 4) 3.0832 0.0979 0.0084 0.0675 0.0001
5.4 Expectations hypothesis
To deﬁne the risk premium, write (5.4) for a two-period bond using the conditional




























Since the conditional covariance term is zero for risk-neutral investors, we call it the


























If the risk premium is zero, we obtain the oldest and simplest theory about the in-
formation content of the term structure—the so-called (pure) expectations hypothesis.
According to the pure expectations hypothesis, forward rates are unbiased predictors
of future spot rates. It is also common to modify the theory so that a constant risk-
premium is allowed. This prediction has come to be known in the literature as the
expectations hypothesis. By and large the empirical literature rejects both versions
of the expectations hypothesis.
We use as a benchmark the Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) test equation.15
These authors tested the expectations hypothesis in the complete markets endowment
15Both versions of the expectations hypothesis are only approximately correct. To see this, as-





from (5.5) we obtain exp
−f1,t = Et[exp
−r1,t+1]. Jensen’s inequality implies that f1,t < Et[r1,t+1].
The diﬀerence between left and right hand sides of this equation is known as convexity bias and it
varies with Et[r1,t+1] and vart[r1,t+1]. To avoid this issue, Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) test the
expectations hypothesis using bond prices rather than bond yields.
23Table 6. Number of rejects for each regression in benchmark











Wald(β0 = β1 = 0) 1000 67
Wald(β1 = 0) 989 63
Wald(β1 = −1) 1000 1000
Table 7. Number of rejects for each regression in nominal term











Wald(β0 = β1 = 0) 172 68
Wald(β1 = 0) 181 66
Wald(β1 = −1) 996 999







1,t = β0 + β1(pF
1,t − pB
1,t) (5.7)
should yield β1 = 0. Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) generated 1000 samples of 200-
period paths for the endogenous variables and used a Wald test with White (1980)
standard errors to check whether β1 = 0 at the 5% signiﬁcance level. They could
reject the hypothesis only roughly 50 times out of 1000 regressions, which is what one
would expect from chance alone. On the other hand, for all values of β1 except −1, the
forward premium is still useful in forecasting changes in spot prices. The hypothesis
β1 = −1 was rejected every time.
Table 6 presents the number of rejections of diﬀerent Wald tests in the regressions
yt+1 = β0 + β1xt
in our benchmark model for nominal term structure. Table 7 presents the same tests
when the habit-formation parameter b = 0. Table 8 displays the same tests for real
term structure, and table 9 displays the test for real term structure when b = 0.
Only the benchmark model is consistent with empirical evidence on the expectations
hypothesis. When the risk premium is subtracted from pB
1,t+1 − pF
1,t the hypothesis
that β1 is equal to zero can be rejected in less than 10% of the samples. Comparing
the tables, is clear that habit-formation is a necessary condition for rejection of the
expectations hypothesis. However, since the hypothesis is rejected for the real term
structure only about 40% of the time, it is the case that monetary policy—which
directly aﬀects nominal rates—plays also an important role. This issue and other
sensitivity analysis are studied in more detail in Section 6.
Table 10 presents estimates of (5.7) over U.S. nominal term structure data and
200,000 model-generated data. The data include quarterly observations of 3 and 6-
month U.S. Treasury bills from 1960:1 to 2006:1. In Table 10, Wald rows refer to the
marginal signiﬁcance level of the corresponding Wald test. The regression coeﬃcient
β1 implied by the New Keynesian model is remarkably close to the value obtained
with U.S. data.
24Table 8. Number of rejects for each regression in benchmark















Wald(β0 = β1 = 0) 1000 66
Wald(β1 = 0) 424 74
Wald(β1 = −1) 1000 1000
Table 9. Number of rejects for each regression in real term struc-















Wald(β0 = β1 = 0) 75 54
Wald(β1 = 0) 69 64
Wald(β1 = −1) 1000 1000
Table 10. Tests of expectations hypothesis in a single regression.
Variable/Test Benchmark Real Benchmark Nominal Data
β0 0.0030 0.0023 0.0126
se(β0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040
β1 −0.2588 −0.4248 −0.4486
se(β1) 0.0044 0.0031 0.1098
R2 0.0204 0.1700 0.0961
Wald(β0 = β1 = 0) 0 0 0
Wald(β1 = 0) 0 0 4.365e−005
Wald(β1 = −1) 0 0 5.1e−007
256 Monetary policy and inﬂation risk premium
Recall the deﬁnitions of one-period zero-coupon nominal bond (5.4) and nominal
stochastic discount factor (5.2)
pB







To deﬁne the inﬂation risk premium, write (6.1) using the deﬁnition of conditional









































Since the conditional covariance term is zero for risk-neutral investors and when the









































or by taking logs and multiplying by −(1/n):











That is, the nominal interest rate equals the sum of the (ex-ante) real interest rate
and the average expected inﬂation.
Table 11 presents the main statistics for inﬂation risk premia in the benchmark
case. The inﬂation risk premium is always positive, and follows a hump-shaped term
structure consistent with the mean-reverting inﬂation.
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) argue that time-variation of the inﬂation risk premium
is an important explanatory variable for deviations from the expectations hypothesis.
We address this question by shutting down the monetary policy shocks, ie, by setting
σmp = 0. Table 12 presents inﬂation risk premia statistics for σmp = 0. Not sur-
prisingly, premia are considerably smaller and less volatile without monetary policy
shocks. If inﬂation risk premia played an important role in rejection of the expec-
tations hypothesis, we would expect the economy with σmp = 0 to produce fewer
rejections. However, Table 13 shows that the expectations hypothesis is actually
rejected more often without monetary policy shocks.
That is, unlike in Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005), large and volatile inﬂation risk
premia do not explain rejections of the expectations hypothesis in the New Keynesian
model. Why is there a negative relationship between the size and volatility of inﬂation
26Table 11. Main inﬂation risk premia statistics, benchmark case.
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
IRP (n = 1) 0.03125 0.00792 −0.22185
IRP (n = 2) 0.05827 0.01088 −0.23463
IRP (n = 4) 0.09122 0.01148 −0.24944
IRP (n = 8) 0.10012 0.01175 −0.19349
IRP (n = 12) 0.07833 0.01620 −0.11236
IRP (n = 16) 0.05105 0.01802 −0.09234
IRP (n = 20) 0.02706 0.01955 −0.06929
Table 12. Main inﬂation risk premia statistics, σmp = 0.
Mean Standard Deviation Correlation with Output
IRP (n = 1) −0.00274 0.00031 −0.02555
IRP (n = 2) −0.00609 0.00061 0.02587
IRP (n = 4) −0.01437 0.00129 0.10234
IRP (n = 8) −0.03447 0.00264 0.16770
IRP (n = 12) −0.05495 0.00402 0.19605
IRP (n = 16) −0.07223 0.00561 0.19235
IRP (n = 20) −0.08531 0.00713 0.23103
Table 13. Number of rejects for each regression in nominal term











Wald(β0 = β1 = 0) 1000 86
Wald(β1 = 0) 993 91
Wald(β1 = −1) 1000 1000
27risk premia and the number of times the expectations hypothesis can be rejected in
our model?
Recall the regression equation (5.7)
pB
1,t+1 − pF
1,t = β0 + β1(pF
1,t − pB
1,t),












Substituting the second equation into the ﬁrst and letting ψt denote the one-period
nominal risk premium yields
pB
1,t+1 − Et[pB
1,t+1] + ψt = β0 + β1(Et[pB
1,t+1] − ψt − pB
1,t).
Et[pB
1,t+1] can be written as pB
1,t+1 − ￿t+1, where the prediction error term, ￿t+1, is
orthogonal to the information available at time t. Hence the estimate of β1 in the
expectations hypothesis regression (5.7) converges to







where ρ denotes corr(ψt,Et∆pB
t+1), σp denotes std(Et∆pB
t+1), σψ denotes std(ψt), and
Et∆pB
t+1 is the expected change in the one-period bond price conditional on time t
information.16
It is illuminating to study equation (6.2) as a function of std(ψt) and std(Et∆pB
t+1).
If ψt is deterministic, ie, σψ = 0, plim ˆ β1 = 0, ie, the expectations hypothesis holds.
On the other hand, if σp = 0, plim ˆ β1 = −1, ie, forward prices are not useful in
predicting future bond prices. As the volatilities σp and σψ diverge to inﬁnity the
opposite result will hold. If σψ → +∞, plim ˆ β1 → −1 and if σp → +∞, plim ˆ β1 → 0.
The behavior of plim ˆ β1 corresponding to the intermediate values of σp and σψ depends
on the sign of ρ. Figures 1 and 2 show the behavior of plim ˆ β1 as a function of σp and
σψ when ρ > 0 and ρ < 0, respectively.
When ρ < 0, plim ˆ β1 is always between 0 and −1. Moreover, if ρ < 0 the behavior
of plim ˆ β1 as a function of σp and σψ is always monotone.








ψ − 2ρσpσψ)2 ≤ 0, if ρ < 0;








ψ − 2ρσpσψ)2 ≥ 0, if ρ < 0.
Therefore, models where ρ < 0 necessarily imply a negative regression coeﬃcient,
consistently with empirical regressions on U.S. data. In the benchmark parameteri-
zation for the New Keynesian model the coeﬃcient ρ is −0.3087 for real bond prices
and −0.3682 for nominal bond prices. The estimate of β1 converges to −0.2588 for
real bond prices and −0.4248 for nominal bond prices. On the other hand, if ρ > 0, it
is possible for plim ˆ β1 to be positive. As a matter of fact, this is the case in the “plain
vanilla” complete-markets endowment economy asset pricing model of Lucas (1978),
as shown by Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) and in Sepp¨ al¨ a (2004). Absent habit
16We compared the plim ˆ β1 obtained in equation (6.2) with the estimate of β1 obtained using
model-generated data. The estimator converged to the theoretical limit across all parameterizations













































Figure 2. plim ˆ β1 as a function of σp and σψ when ρ < 0.
29Table 14. Number of rejects for each regression in nominal term











Wald(β0 = β1 = 0) 1000 73
Wald(β1 = 0) 843 155
Wald(β1 = −1) 1000 1000
formation in preferences, the New Keynesian model implies that the coeﬃcient ρ is
0.0830 for real bond prices and 0.0402 for nominal bond prices, and the estimator
β1 converges to −0.0080 for real bond prices and −0.1628 for nominal bond prices,
making it much harder to reject the expectations hypothesis.
Habit-formation preferences help the New Keynesian model to match the empirical
estimates of β1 in the Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) regression but are not suﬃcient
to ensure that the expectations hypothesis is rejected. To this end, models where
ρ < 0 need to generate either very high volatility in the risk premium or very low
volatility in the predictable component of bond price changes, or a combination of
suﬃciently high volatility in the risk premium and suﬃciently low volatility in the
predictable component of bond price changes.
The literature on the equity premium puzzle (Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher,
1997, Athanasoulis and Sussman, 2004) has emphasized that habit formation gener-
ates excessively volatile short-term interest rates. This would be the case also in the
New Keynesian model, but for the fact that the monetary policy authority cares about
interest rate smoothing. Interest rate smoothing limits the volatility of short-term
interest rates and of the short-term bond prices, thereby reducing std(Et∆pb
t+1).
A similar argument was raised earlier by Mankiw and Miron (1986), and empirical
evidence supports this interpretation. Mankiw and Miron show that it is much more
diﬃcult to reject the expectations hypothesis using data prior to the founding of the
Fed.17 They suggest that the explanation is the Federal Reserve’s commitment to
stabilizing interest rates.
Model simulations where the central bank is assumed to have a weaker commit-
ment to stabilize interest rates conﬁrm this intuition. Table 14 present results for the
Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) regression in a model where the interest rate smooth-
ing coeﬃcient χ is lowered to 0.7.18 In this economy the expectations hypothesis can
be rejected in only 84% of the samples.
When one studies nominal interest rates, volatility in the nominal risk premium
may be due to either a real risk premium or inﬂation risk premium.19 In Buraschi
and Jiltsov (2005), most of the volatility in the nominal risk premium originates
in the inﬂation risk premium. In our case, the combination of volatile real risk
premium and interest rate smoothing by the Central Bank contribute to rejections
of the expectations hypothesis.20 H¨ ordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2005) also ﬁnd in a
New Keynesian model, similar to ours but solved with a second-order approximation
17Choi and Wohar (1991) cannot reject the expectations hypothesis for the sample period 1910–
1914.
18For values of χ < 0.7, the set over which the model is stable is too small to generate long
simulations without leading to explosive solutions. This is a well-known problem when dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models are solved using higher-order approximation (see Kim, Kim,
Schaumburg, and Sims, 2005, for a discussion).
19See, eg, H¨ ordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2005) for a derivation of this result.
20Recall that we were able to reject the expectations hypothesis for real bond prices only about
40% of the time; see Table 8.
30Table 15. Sensitivity of the expectations hypothesis regression to
diﬀerent parameter values. BM = benchmark.
Wald(β1 = 0) β1
BM 989 −0.4246
b = 0 181 −0.1628
γ = 1.5 777 −0.3201
χ = 0.7 843 −0.3746
πss = 1.0 995 −0.4420
πss = 1.01 993 −0.4386
ωy = 0.1 972 −0.5450
ωπ = 3.0 978 −0.4252
ωπ = 1.2 991 −0.4170
θp = 0.5 989 −0.4306
σd=0,
σa=0.01 859 −0.3348
σa = 0 964 −0.4088
σmp = 0 995 −0.6067
σmp = 0.006 934 −0.3904
ρd=ρa=0.99,
σmp=0,χ=0.95 999 −0.5689
(implying constant premia), that the inﬂation risk premium contributes very little to
the nominal risk premium.
6.1 Sensitivity analysis
Rejection of the expectations hypothesis is a robust feature of the New Keynesian
model. Table 15 presents the Wald test results for the regression (5.7) estimated on
model-generated data under alternative parameterizations. BM indicates the bench-
mark parameterization. Only the absence of habit formation (b = 0) in the prefer-
ences speciﬁcation, a lower value of the risk aversion coeﬃcient (γ = 1.5), and a lower
degree of interest rate smoothing behavior (χ = 0.7) notably reduce the number of
times the expectations hypothesis is rejected. The table shows that a high correlation
exists between the number of times the expectations hypothesis can be rejected and
the size of the regression coeﬃcient β1.
7 Conclusions
Dotsey and Otrok (1995) write in their survey article analyzing rejections of the
expectations hypothesis when the term premia are exogenous
“[R]egression results [for the expectations hypothesis] that are in accord
with those obtained in practise can be generated by the combination of (i)
Fed behavior that both smooths the movements in interest rates... and (ii)
time-varying term premia that are calibrated to match data moments.”
We propose a New Keynesian model where habit formation delivers (ii) and interest
rate smoothing delivers (i). The diﬀerence compared to earlier results is that we
generate time-varying term premia endogenously. It is worth noting that our model
requires a large degree of smoothing by economic agents. In our model, consumers
31smooth consumption because of habit formation, ﬁrms smooth prices because of sticky
prices, and the central bank smooths interest rates.21
Rejection of the expectation hypothesis in the New Keynesian model does not rely
on exogenous volatility of monetary policy. Even when all business cycle volatility
is generated by real shocks, the behavior of interest rates implied by the systematic
portion of monetary policy is suﬃcient to ensure that the expectations hypothesis is
rejected. Because of nominal rigidities, monetary policy can inﬂuence the volatility
of both real and nominal variables and the hedging value of bonds, therefore inﬂuenc-
ing risk premium behavior. Volatility in the inﬂation risk premium cannot explain
rejection of the expectations hypothesis.
21We are grateful to David Marshall for this observation.
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36A Inﬂation rate dynamics
Iterating (2.16) and (2.17), we obtain:
ˆ Gt+1 = µMUCt+1MCt+1Pθ−1
t+1 Yt+1 + θpβ ˆ Gt+2
ˆ Gt+2 = µMUCt+2MCt+2Pθ−1
t+2 Yt+2 + θpβ ˆ Gt+3
ˆ Ht+1 = MUCt+1Pθ−1
t+1 Yt+1 + θpβ ˆ Ht+2
ˆ Ht+2 = MUCt+2Pθ−1
t+2 Yt+2 + θpβ ˆ Ht+3
or
ˆ Gt = µMUCtMCtPθ−1
t Yt + θpβ
h
µMUCt+1MCt+1Pθ−1
t+1 Yt+1 + θpβ ˆ Gt+2
i
= µMUCtMCtPθ−1







t+2 Yt+2 + θpβ ˆ Gt+3
￿￿
= µMUCtMCtPθ−1










+ (θpβ)3 ˆ Gt+3,
and
ˆ Ht = MUCtPθ−1
t Yt + θpβ
h
MUCt+1Pθ−1
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i
= MUCtPθ−1
t Yt + θpβ
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37To obtain stationary variables under a positive money growth rate steady state
regime start from equations (2.16)–(2.17) and divide ˆ Gt by Pθ












































= MUCtYt + θpβ ˜ Ht+1(1 + πt+1)θ−1 (A.6)
































The law of motion for the price index
P1−θ
t = θpP1−θ
t−1 + (1 − θp)Pt(z)1−θ = θpP1−θ





can be divided by P1−θ
t to obtain
[(1 + πt)]
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